In this letter, we show that some stream authentication schemes using hash chaining are highly vulnerable to denial of service (DoS) attacks. An adversary can disrupt all receivers of group by making use of modifying a few packets in those schemes. key words: stream authentication schemes, hash chaining, denial of service(DoS) attack
Introduction
Hash chaining provides a cost effective means with a realtime streaming application which needs to support data origin authentication and integrity protection in multicast. To reduce the cost of digital signature including both the computation and the communication overhead in some stream authentication schemes [1] - [4] , the source generates an amortizing signature over a set of packets called a block. As a result, a signature can be generated and transmitted once a block at the beginning or at the end of a block, which contains the hash value of the first or the last packet in a block. In addition, each packet, which contains only a few hash values of its previous or succeed packets as an authentication tag, is transmitted continuously, thus this is called hash chaining.
From the viewpoint of efficiency, previous work using hash chaining may be appropriate but can be suffered from the denial of service attack. In particular, the DoS attack on the receiver side is much serious problem in multicast than those in the case of unicast since a single adversary can disrupt thousands of receivers at a time. In this letter, we show that just one or a few packet's modifications can cause the failed verification of all packets in the block.
Notations
We use the following notations throughout this letter: H(·) denotes a collision-resistant hash function. σ is a signature which is generated by a signing function denoted Sig(sk, h k ), where sk is the private key of the source and h k denotes the hash value of the kth packet, namely h k = H(P k ). The verification function is denoted by Ver(pk, σ, h k ), where pk is the public key of the source. α||β denotes the concatenation of data α and β. Adv and GR stands for an adver- sary and receiver group respectively. Finally, we refer to modF(∃{·}) and modF(∀{·}) as the modifying processing of an Adv, where ∀{·} and ∃{·} denote all and some elements of the set given to an Adv respectively.
Review of Authentication Schemes Using Hash Chaining
In order to reduce the cost of digital signature on streaming data, several researchers have proposed authentication schemes employing hash chaining [1] - [4] . In 1997, Gennaro and Rohatgi proposed the off-line solution where only the first packet is digitally signed [1] . The source generates the first packet, P 0 = [σ||h 1 ], where σ = Sig(sk, h 1 ), and then continuously sends each packet which contains the hash value of its next packet. The kth packet, for example, contains message and the hash value of the next packet,
. Therefore, if the receiver is able to verify the first signature, namely Ver(pk, σ, h 1 ) is true, then whole packets in a stream are verifiable. That is, the receiver calculates the hash value of the arriving packet and compares it with the stored hash value which was extracted from the previous packet. If both are equal, the receiver accepts the packet. Otherwise, he/she rejects it. Shortcomings of the off-line solution are that it is not loss tolerant and the source must know the entire stream in advance. Thus the off-line solution is impractical to use for an application which wishes to send a real-time stream over an unreliable channel such as Internet. To overcome these shortcomings, [2] - [4] have been proposed recently. Main difference between [1] and these schemes, on one hand, each packet contains several hash values of previous packets and a signature is also generated with several hash values to achieve robustness against packet loss. On the other hand, the source transmits a signature packet periodically for supporting real-time streaming.
Authors of those schemes have commonly used a graph representation to explain their hash chaining authentication scheme simply. A packet in a stream is regarded as a node and each hash link from node to node is regarded as an edge in the graph representation as described in Fig. 1 . The receiver is able to verify a packet if there exists at least one unbroken path from the packet node to the signature node. Any node which is regarded as a packet loss are removed from the graph. 
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Security Analysis
We consider that a stream is transmitted over an unreliable and insecure network. There exist an active Adv who has powerful ability to modify, inject and drop some packets and to rearrange the packet sequence.
Suppose that the stream is divided into n chunks denoted M i , where 0 < i ≤ n, and the source transmits a signature packet periodically where both a signature packet and each packet contains two hash values of previous packets as described in Fig. 1 . Following three cases show that how to break a hash chaining to mount a DoS attack.
If σ or at least one of hash values belonging to the signature packet is/are modified by Adv, then the verification result must be false, namely Ver(pk, σ, (h n ||h n−2 )) = false, where Adv modified h n−2 for example. Modified signature packet results in failed verifications of all packets in the block.
Adv modify two nodes of packets that have the directed edge to the signature node. In this case, Ver(pk, σ, (h n ||h n−2 )) is true, thereafter the receiver tries to check the integrity of P n and P n−2 . After comparing H(Ḿ n ||h n−1 ||h n−3 ) with h n within the signature packet, the receiver can detect that there exists modification in P n . But there is no way to ensure which part of [M n , h n−1 , h n−3 ] was modified in transit. This is due to the fact that the hash value, h n , was generated with a message chunk, M n , and two hash values of previous packets, h n−1 and h n−3 , altogether. As a result, the link from P n−1 to Sig is broken because P n should be removed from the graph. Moreover, this incurs that the receiver can verify neither P n−1 nor P n−3 . After that, the receiver tries to verify the packet P n−2 but fails with the same reason. Therefore, all paths to the signature node are broken.
In this case, a packet and its hash value are modified by an Adv. The hash value of this packet is appended to the node which have the directed edge to the signature node. Similarly to the above case, the receiver cannot recognize which part was modified in P n , where P n containsh n−3 , even though h n−1 is equal to H(P n−1 ). Likewise, the verification of P n−2 also fails, thus no packet can be verified. Example 1: Adv is able to break the hash chain by making use of modification of small number of packets in a block. For example, authors of [2] experimented that the signature packet was transmitted every 250 packets and the hash chaining had 6 edges to signature node. In the case of adopting this example to above case 1,2, and 3 respectively, only efforts of modifying 1, 6, or 7 packets lead to useless of 250 packets.
